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Abstract 
Recent legal and social acknowledgement of (some) trans citizenship claims 
demonstrates the continuing evolution of trans politics and identity, and the 
relationship between socio-political identities and popular culture. This article 
examines current debates over trans citizenship and identity, and argues that certain 
kinds of identity and citizenship claims have cultural currency in contemporary 
representations of sex/gender. In order to address these issues, this article highlights 
key disputes and tensions in contemporary debates about transgender identity, 
citizenship and claims to legal rights, by examining the ways in which sex/gender 
identity is portrayed in three films - Cabaret, Transamerica and Hedwig and the Angry 
Inch. Each film demonstrates various ways of interpreting and reworking the 
constraints of heteronormative binary notions of sex/gender, and these struggles over 
meaning are also reflected in the ways in which different articulations of trans identity 
and citizenship claims have been legally and culturally recognised. The article 
explores the ways in which particular accounts of trans identity are given primacy 
within law, and how film can help us to reflect upon questions about which 
sexed/gendered people get to count as legal citizens. The paper concludes by 
reminding us that despite discourses of recognition, it is important to remember the 
exclusionary as well as inclusionary tendencies of law. 
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“We Walk Among You”: Trans identity politics goes to the movies 
 
Sharon Cowan, University of Edinburgh 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the UK, the development of legal discourse on transgender identity and citizenship, 
or what Andrew Sharpe calls ‘Transgender Jurisprudence’,1 has been of concern to 
critical legal scholars for some years now, and has led to a broad range of work 
including theoretical approaches,
2
 law reform and policy oriented work driven by 
distinctly (human) rights based analyses,
3
 as well as comparative analyses of the legal 
status of trans people in different jurisdictions, such as the UK and Canada.
4
 In 
particular, recent changes to the legal and political articulation of sex/gender identity 
and citizenship have prompted critical engagement. For example, the UK has 
relatively recently introduced the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, the former recognising same sex civil unions (but not 
marriages), and the latter recognising the rights of (some) transgender people to be 
legally recognised in their self perceived gender. These Acts have provoked debate 
and critique,
5
 and of course some interesting research. For instance, in relation to civil 
                                                 

 I would like to thank the participants of the 2008 Berkeley meeting of the Association for the Study 
of Law, Culture and the Humanities, and the 2007 Berlin joint meeting of the LSA/ISA, for their 
comments and feedback on earlier incarnations of this paper. Thanks also to the editors of this special 
issue, Gillian Calder and Rebecca Johnson, for their patience and encouragement in allowing this paper 
to blossom, and to anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. 
1
 Andrew Sharpe Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Routledge, 
Cavendish, 2002). 
2
 For example Andrew Sharpe “Institutionalising Heterosexuality: The Legal Exclusion of 
“Impossible” 
(Trans)sexualities”, in Les Moran, Daniel Monk and Sarah Beresford, eds., Legal Queeries: Lesbian, 
|Gay and Transgender Legal Studies (London: Cassell, 1998); Ralph Sandland “Crossing and not 
Crossing: Gender, Sexuality and Melancholy in the European Court of Human Rights, Christine 
Goodwin v. United Kingdom (Application no. 28957/95), I. v. United Kingdom (Application no. 
25680/94) (ECHR)” (2003) 11(2) Feminist Legal Studies 191–209; Ralph Sandland “Between “Truth” 
and “Difference”: Poststructuralism, Law and the Power of Feminism” (1995) 3(1) Feminist Legal 
Studies 3-47. 
3
 For instance, Stephen Whittle Respect and Equality: Transsexual and Transgender Rights (London: 
Cavendish 2002) 
4
 See for example, Sharon Cowan “Gender is no substitute for Sex” A Comparative Human Rights 
Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity,” (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 67-96.  
5
 For example, on the Gender Recognition Act see: Andrew Sharpe, Ralph Sandland and Sharon 
Cowan, “The Gender Recognition Act 2004: Debate and Dialogue” (2009) 18(2) Social and Legal 
Studies (forthcoming); but see also Stephen Whittle “The Opposite of Sex is Politics – The UK Gender 
Recognition Act and Why it is Not Perfect, Just Like You and Me” (2006) 15(3) Journal of Gender 
Studies 267-271. On the Civil Partnerships Act see Nicola Barker “Sex and the Civil Partnership Act: 
The Future of (Non) Conjugality?” (2006) 14(2) Feminist Legal Studies 241-259. 
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partnerships, sociological and socio-legal studies have been carried out by Rosie 
Harding, who has investigated the legal consciousness of same sex couples who want 
to enter in civil partnership and be recognised by the state,
6
 and by Carol Smart and 
Beccy Shipman who have interviewed same sex couples who have decided to enter 
into civil partnership, asking them what their reasons were for doing so.
7
  
 
This type of legal and social consciousness research has been accompanied by a body 
of sociological work; researchers such as Sally Hines
8
 and Surya Munro
9
 have been 
investigating notions of trans identity and citizenship, and asking transgender folk 
how they see themselves in terms of sex/gender identity. In addition, studies by Press 
for Change, the leading UK trans campaigning and pressure group, have examined the 
experiences of trans people across a range of issues such as discrimination, health and 
relationships.
10
 However there has been no research, at least in the UK, that 
corresponds to the kind of legal consciousness research on civil partnerships, asking 
trans people why (or why not) they turn to law and rights to solve social issues, for 
example by way of legislation such as the Gender Recognition Act 2004. This raises 
questions about the need for ethnographic research within the trans community, in its 
broadest sense, regarding the desirability of legal reform and the effectiveness of legal 
regulation of sex/gender identity.
11
 
 
As this growing body of legal regulation and socio-legal research has emerged, it 
seems also that culturally trans people are currently everywhere. In the UK, as well as 
other jurisdictions such North America, the transgender movement, if it can be 
                                                 
6
 Rosie Harding ““Dogs Are Registered, People Shouldn’t Be”: Legal consciousness and Lesbian and 
Gay Rights” 2006 15(4) Social and Legal Studies  513-535. 
7
 Beccy Shipman and Carol Smart “‘It’s Made a Huge Difference’: Recognition, Rights and the 
Personal Significance of Civil Partnership” (2007) 12(1) Sociological Research Online,  
8
 Sally Hines “(Trans)Forming Gender: Social Change and Transgender Citizenship” (2007) 12(1) 
Sociological Research Online  
9
 Surya Munro Gender Politics: Activism, Citizenship and Sexual Diversity (London: Pluto Press, 
2005); “Transgender Politics in the UK” (2003) 23(4) Critical Social Policy 433-452. 
10
 Stephen Whittle, Lewis Turner and Maryam Al-Alami Engendered Penalities:Transgender and 
Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination (A Research Project and Report 
Commissioned by the Equalities Review, 2007, available at 
http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/EngenderedPenalties.pdf); Stephen Whittle, Lewis Turner, Ryan Combs 
and Stephenne Rhodes Transgender EuroStudy: Legal Survey and Focus on the Transgender 
Experience of Healthcare (ILGA Europe, 2008, available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/eurostudy.pdf).   
11
 Paisley Currah has undertaken empirical research in the US interviewing trans activists about their 
choice of legal strategies when arguing for trans rights. See “Gender Pluralisms under the Transgender 
Umbrella” in Paisley Currah, Richard Juang and Shannon Price Minter, eds., Transgender Rights 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2006). 
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referred to as such, has gained widespread visibility and recognition, though not 
always positively. In the UK, transgender characters have appeared in a mainstream 
prime-time television soap opera (Coronation Street), a reality television show (Big 
Brother), advertisements for the soft drink ‘Irn Bru’, and in the lyrics of pop songs 
(such as the Welsh pop group Goldie Lookin’ Chain’s ‘Your Mother’s Got a Penis). 
Stories about transgender individuals are often in the mainstream press (though often 
they are sensational stories of transsexual individuals who have changed their minds 
about their reassignment surgery).
12
 In the US, while legal and political gains may in 
some ways trail behind those of the UK,
13
 the visibility of trans people has also 
increased. Take for example recent reports of the trans man Thomas Beattie, who, 
having kept his uterus, gave birth to a baby girl in mid 2008. In a climactic moment of 
mainstream cultural visibility, Beattie appeared on the Oprah Winfrey show to tell his 
story.
14
 The media interest in Beattie has recently been revived in light of the news 
that he is pregnant with his second child.
15
 
 
Amidst the frenzy of cases such as this, the growing acknowledgement of trans 
citizenship claims that have been made both legally and in popular culture enables us 
to question the ongoing evolution of trans politics and identity, and the relationship 
between socio-political identities and popular culture. In order to explore this issue, 
this paper will highlight key disputes and tensions in contemporary debates about 
transgender identity, citizenship and claims to legal rights, by examining the ways in 
which sex/gender identity is portrayed in three very different films.  
                                                 
12
 See: “Torment of sex change soldier trapped in a woman’s body’ Scotland on Sunday, 28 April 2002; 
“Mistaken Identity” Guardian, Weekend, 31 July 2004; “Accused doctor quits transsexualism 
committee”  Guardian, 28 September 2004. In addition see 
www.transgenderzone.com/features/changemeback.htm and www.pfc.org.uk/pfclists/news-
arc/2004q3/msg00103.htm.  
13
 See Introduction in Currah, Juang and Minter (eds) supra, note 9. 
14
 Despite Oprah Winfrey’s sympathetic interview of Beattie when he appeared on her show in April 
2008, reporting of this story has often been extremely negative. See for example: 
http://www.towleroad.com/2008/04/david-letterman.html (David Letterman on his US television show 
referred to Beattie as “an androgynous freak show”; http://www.towleroad.com/2008/04/morning-joe-
hos.html (where the hosts of a US cable show Morning Joe referred to Beattie’s pregnancy as 
disgusting and nauseating); and http://sandrarose.com/2008/04/04/oprah-puts-on-a-freak-show/. In 
news reports of this case, inverted commas are often used around ‘pregnant man’ or even ‘transsexual’. 
See for example http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7488894.stm; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/04/usa.gender;   
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/20082851311794. 
15
 See for example the interview of Beattie and his wife by Larry King, the transcribed version of 
which is available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/11/18/lkl.beatie.qanda/index.html. 
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A word about terminology. Transsexual” has begun to be used as an adjective rather 
than a noun.
16
 Many people also use the term trans rather than transsexual or 
transgender.
17
 I will use ‘trans’ in this paper as an ‘umbrella’ term used to describe a 
wide range of people who do not conform to the heteronormative sex/gender binary, 
and who either purposefully or just by their existence, challenge that binary.
18
 It 
covers identities (and practices) that include transvestites, transsexuals, those who 
wish to take hormones but not engage in surgery, intersex people, drag performers, 
and a range of others that we mostly don’t have words for but are, generally speaking, 
sex/gender rebels.
19
 Herein the term trans or transgender refers to what might be 
called the broader community of these gender rebels, although the term transsexual 
also appears as it is still commonly used in legal, medical and social discourses to 
describe individuals who wish to cross over and be recognised as fully as possible as 
the sex/gender opposite to that attributed at birth.  
 
I do not identify as trans. However it is important for all those, trans or otherwise, 
who are interested in sex/gender issues to fully engage with the questions and debates 
raised by the ways in which trans identity is legally and socially regulated.  All of us 
are affected by the heteronormativity that pervades legal and political debates about 
‘what to do about the trans problem’. All of us are affected by the ways in which trans 
people’s attempts to gain rights or cultural visibility are translated into law. This is not 
solely because as human beings we should all be interested in the fate of other human 
beings, though that is certainly true. People across the world who identify as trans are 
at risk of discrimination, violence and death – a transgender day of remembrance 
ceremony was held in London in November 2008, to memorialise those who have 
been killed in the last year simply for being trans. Beyond these matters of life and 
death, however, it is also important to pay attention to the way in which trans people 
have struggled for legal and social acceptance, because the constraining 
heteronormative assumptions and ideologies about sex and gender that underpin the 
                                                 
16
 See Press for Change, Submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights Regarding the Draft 
Gender Recognition Bill (2003), paragraph A.2.a., at n.2 (available at www.pfc.org.uk/gr-bill/jchr-
sub.pdf ).  
17
 Stephen Whittle, “The Trans-Cyberian Mail Way”, (1998) 7(3) Social and Legal Studies 389-408.   
18
 See Whittle, Turner and Al-Alami, supra note 10. For brief discussion of the potential problems of 
using this umbrella term, and on what it might mean to be trans, see Judith Halberstam In a Queer Time 
and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: New York University Press, 2005), at 
49; 54. 
19
 See also Paisley Currah  supra note 11.  
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dominant medico-legal and social discourses about trangenderism, also constrain the 
sexed/gendered lives of non-trans people. It is important that we all remain alert to 
this and, in recognising the unique specificity of trans experience, do not 
compartmentalise trans issues as single issue politics. 
 
This paper begins by briefly setting out the reasons for using film to look at trans 
identity and rights, before going on to explain the choice of films for analysis. The 
remainder of the article undertakes to understand something about recent rights and 
citizenship claims that have been made by and for the trans movements in both the 
UK and the US, before going on to examine cinematic portrayals of trans identity in 
three films: Cabaret, Transamerica, and Hedwig and the Angry Inch. 
 
 
2. Using film to understand trans-Atlantic sex/gender rights claims 
 
Film scholars have argued that it is important to bring to light the things that film can 
teach us about our legal and social world. Orit Kamir suggests that “Law and film 
both create meaning through storytelling, performance, and ritualistic patterning, 
envisioning and constructing human subjects and social groups, individuals and 
worlds.”20 Indeed, they are “two of contemporary society’s dominant cultural 
formations, two prominent vehicles for the chorus through which society creates and 
narrates itself”.21 As such, Rebecca Johnson and Ruth Buchanan have suggested that 
there is much to learn by taking cinematic portrayals of law very seriously, not as 
representations of the “truth” of law but as analogies for how law itself operates in 
helping to construct truth.
22
  
 
Similarly, there is much to learn by looking at how films depict sex and gender, not as 
representations of sex/gender truths, but as a way of seeing how so called truths are 
constructed and maintained, and how meaning is created. The contemporary politics 
of transgender identity, and struggles for citizenship, can thus be seen within the 
                                                 
20
 Orit Kamir Framed: Women in Law and Film (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
21
 Orit Kamir “Why ‘Law-and-Film’ and What Does it Actually Mean? A Perspective” (2005) 19(2) 
Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 255-278 at 256. 
22
 Rebecca Johnson and Ruth Buchanan “Getting the Insider’s Story Out: What Popular Film Can Tell 
Us About Legal Method’s Dirty Secret” (2001) 20 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 87-110 at 
88. 
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cinematic portrayal of sex/gender. Johnston and Buchanan claim that: “Struggles over 
meaning, shifting social roles and expectations get played out in films and in 
courtrooms everyday. Learning how to unpack the interweaving of truth, justice and 
narrative might help us to see how law comes to recognise some emerging claims for 
justice whilst dismissing others”.23 The same can be said of sex/gender; analysing the 
ways in which sex/gender is depicted in film demonstrates a recognition of some 
sex/gender identity claims and a dismissal, or at least incomprehension or 
misrecognition, of others. Equally, Jessica Silbey states that studying law films can 
“reveal the way law lives beyond its formal processes”.24 Analysing the portrayal of 
sex/gender identity in film also reveals non-formal (i.e. non legal) regulatory 
mechanisms that socially constrain and enable us to theoretically and politically 
conceptualise sexual identity.  
 
Although films cannot be said to hold up a mirror to the world around us, they are a 
window into contemporary values and popular perceptions of social life. The stories 
portrayed in movies are not purely fictional escapism; rather, as Johnson and 
Buchanan argue, we must recognise “…the ways in which representations bleed into 
and shape the reality they purport to reflect”.25 Movies do not only represent life, but 
indeed are “the most visible site of ideological struggle waged for access to and 
control of these representations”.26 Likewise, Stephen Bowles reminds us that: “Some 
2500 years ago Aristotle advanced the notion that the stories a culture tells about itself 
reveal more about that culture than any archival compilation of information.”27 
Therefore, this paper argues that by engaging with the popular cultural representation 
of sex/gender in film we can shed light on the ways in which society engages with 
socio-political and cultural questions about what it means to live as trans, and that 
trans movies can tell us something about the ways in which particular political 
discourses come to dominant sex/gender identity debates and construct ‘good’ legal 
sexual subjects. 
 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. at 110. 
24
 Jessica Silbey “Patterns of Courtroom Justice” (2001) 28(1) Journal of Law and Society 97-116. 
25
 Supra note 22 at 91. 
26
 Ibid. at 96, quoting from R.B. Ray A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 21. 
27
 Stephen Bowles “Cabaret and Nashville: The Musical as Social Comment” (2004) 12(3) Journal of 
Popular Culture 550-556 at 550. 
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This paper draws upon the cinematic portrayals of sex/gender in three North 
American movies, analysing these alongside the development of transgender politics 
in both the UK and the US. For a number of reasons, the argument is illustrated by 
way of three US-produced films. For one thing, unlike the UK, the US has a wide 
range of movies dealing with trans identity issues from which to choose,
28
 while few 
UK based films deal with sex/gender identity issues (Neil Jordan’s films The Crying 
Game (1993), and Breakfast on Pluto (2005), and the 1982 Blake Edwards film 
Victor/Victoria being notable exceptions).
29
 For pragmatic reasons then, the use of US 
films is an obvious choice. In addition, the permeation and indeed saturation of the 
UK film market with movies made in North America is beyond doubt. At least two of 
the three films analysed here (Cabaret and Transamerica) will be known (if not well 
known) to mainstream UK film audiences (though perhaps of different generations). 
And while the two jurisdictions
30
 vary in innumerable ways, both generally rely on 
liberal conceptions of rights, law and citizenship, and the influence of these notions 
upon the trans movement on both sides of the Atlantic will, it is hoped, be clear from 
the analysis below. 
 
More importantly, the choice of these three particular films is based on their 
commonality, in that they all deal with issues of transition, crossing, and liminality. 
Given that each film describes (and is produced within) a different social, temporal 
and cultural context, they each take a different approach to trans issues. Broadly 
speaking, all three demonstrate various ways in which people strain against – and 
work within – normative sex/gender categories, but crucially, in each movie the trans 
story is one where “gender ambiguity is not a trap or a device but part of the 
production of new forms of heroism, vulnerability, visibility and embodiment”.31  
Each film tells the story of sex/gender identity performances, and also, for two of 
                                                 
28
 To name but a few, of various different genres, and in no particular order: Boys Don’t Cry (1999); 
Some Like it Hot (1959); To Wong Foo Thanks for Everything (1995); Tootsie (1982); The Rocky 
Horror Picture Show (1975); Mrs Doubtfire (1993); Dressed to Kill (1980).  
29
 Both of Jordan’s films are analysed in John Phillips Transgender on Screen (Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006), and the Crying Game is also discussed by Judith Halberstam, supra note 15. 
Victor/Victoria was made by in the UK by an American director with both American and British actors. 
I do not intend here to engage in a discussion of what makes a film ‘British’ or ‘American’, though 
Victor/Victoria is, ironically, in some senses both. 
30
 For the purposes of this article I leave aside the fact that one could interpret the US as constituted by 
many different jurisdictions, and that within the UK there are at least 3 different legal systems in 
operation (Scotland, England and Wales, and Northern Ireland). 
31
 Judith Halberstam, supra note 18 at 96. 
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these films, the struggle for legal or social identity validation, and the sexual subject is 
taken seriously in that none of the three uses a transgender story either to ‘surprise’ 
the viewer, or purely as a vehicle for comedy or human tragedy (even though there are 
moments of comedy and tragedy in each film).  
 
Before analysing the films in more detail, I begin with a discussion of the ways in 
which recent trans identity claims - both political and theoretical - have evolved, in 
order to explore the tensions and dichotomies that suffuse debates about sex/gender 
identity. I then go on to tease out the ways in which these various competing 
approaches to questions of sex/gender have seeped into cultural representations in 
popular film. Engaging with the ways in which film deals with these difficult 
questions of categories, boundaries and identity can in turn help illuminate the ways 
in which socio-political investment in heteronormative binary sex/gender categories 
can be both maintained and, to some extent, evaded. 
 
3. The dichotomies of trans identity politics 
 
It seems that trans politics has been riven by binary positioning on the issue of what it 
means to be trans. Two particular competing articulations of this question have 
emerged, one based on deconstructing sex/gender categories, the other on crossing 
boundaries but investing in categories.  While the conflict between the two should not 
be overstated, it is apparent within and between transgender groups and communities. 
For example, Katrina Roen documents the tensions in two strands of transgender 
political activism – on the one hand for one group of trans people, passing is the 
ultimate in “selling out” – “complicit with normative gendering” and is “contrary to 
the gender transgressive ethic of transgender politics”.32 For these people, being trans 
is about gender fluidity and challenging the heteronormative binaries of sex/gender. 
Passing is assimilationist.  Adhering to the psychiatric and medical models that 
dominate discussions of transsexuality is dangerous, gives too much control to the 
medical profession and pathologises trans folk. Roen connects this political activism 
to postmodern and distinctly queer notions of sexual identity as contingent and fluid. 
This discourse around this position usually refers to the status of being transgender or 
                                                 
32
 Katrina Roen ““Either/Or” and “Both/Neither”: Discursive Tensions in Transgender Politics” (2002) 
27(2) Signs 501-522 at 501. 
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trans rather than transsexual. Roen terms this the “both/neither” approach - some of 
her interviewees described themselves as being both genders, or neither gender. 
 
One the other hand, Roen suggests, for a second group of trans people there is another 
equally strong pull in the opposite direction, to affirm existing sex/gender categories 
but to allow people to cross over, to adopt the “other” category. This position is 
founded in the “modernist” assumption that there are two biological sexes and that 
one’s gender should mirror one’s biological sex – men are masculine, women are 
feminine and so on. This is usually connected to a discourse of transsexuality rather 
than transgender.
33
 Again Roen found in her interviews with trans people that many 
described themselves in these terms. She calls this the “either/or” approach. While 
one might be tempted to see this as identity politics, as Roen suggests, it is a curious 
form of identity politics as the end goal of the transsexual identity claims is to obscure 
one’s identity as a “transsexual”.34 Thus the overriding aim for the transsexual 
movement is to enable crossing, followed by the rendering of that crossing invisible.
35
 
 
This demarcation between both/neither and either/or approaches is obviously a 
simplistic division, a heuristic device for the purposes of highlighting tensions 
between two political positions. It is not to say that there is clear bright line between 
the two. In fact Roen’s research shows that people often hold views on themselves 
that demonstrate elements of both of these political positions.
36
 Similarly, Sally Hines 
describes the movement for transgender citizenship as being an “uneven and 
contested terrain”.37 In her interviews with trans people she found differing levels of 
experience of identity that shifted both spatially, across borders, and temporally, 
across their lives. 
 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. at 501-2. 
34
 Ibid.  at 502. 
35
 And indeed, while many transsexuals do not wish to legally identify as such, there is a middle 
position, a rejection of this binary dichotomy, and an adoption of a third kind of identity, neither male 
nor female, which is validated by some legal jurisdictions; this approach was recently taken in Tamil 
Nadu, in India, where for the first time a transsexual person was allowed to identify themselves on their 
official ration card as transsexual rather than male or female. See 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Third_sex_gets_official_status_in_TN/articleshow/2869909.cms. 
36
 Supra note 32. 
37
 Hines, supra note 8 at para 1.3. 
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 However, it seems that while there is a range of people across the sex/gender political 
spectrum who identify in different ways, some of whom do not neatly fit her 
classification, Roen found that the majority of those campaigning on trans issues fall 
into one of two camps - crossing with legal recognition (either/or), or living at the 
limits, defying sex/gender boundaries, and embracing fluidity (both/neither). And it is 
clear that at the farthest ends of the trans spectrum, these positions do clash over the 
question of what should be the main strategy or goal of the trans movement – 
challenging heteronormative gendered identities, or allowing people to live and be 
recognised according to their sex/gender as self perceived.  
 
This political debate, and its ongoing tensions, are not new. It is very similar to the 
debates that emerged within the gay and lesbian movement in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, where the radical politics and strategies of the short lived Gay Liberation Front 
(which emerged in the US and in the UK) were in direct conflict with previous (and 
subsequent) reformist and liberal political campaigns by gay and lesbian groups. The 
kind of politics embraced by the GLF, unlike the politics of many previous and 
subsequent gay activists, relied little on ideas of “ethnic” models community, fixed 
identities and formal legal reform - in short, gays and lesbian activists, heavily 
influenced by feminism, questioned the construction of gender and sexuality.
38
 These 
activists wanted to smash the existing sex/gender system, and their position is neatly 
summed up in Altman’s statement “Everyone is gay, everyone is straight”.39 This is 
similar to the position taken by trans activists who challenge sex/gender on the basis 
that to divide society into two groups of male and female is to deny the extent to 
which the existence of two categories is socially constructed and the division between 
the two, arbitrary. One might say then that everyone is male, everyone is female. 
Seidman states that “the aim of gay liberation was to abolish a sex/gender system that 
privileges heterosexuality and men”. 40 In the same vein, the trans activists who 
challenge sex/gender are also influenced by feminist and other analyses of sex/gender, 
                                                 
38
 See for example Steven Seidman “Identity politics in a “postmodern” gay culture: some historical 
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and want to free all people - not just trans people - to be able to express themselves as 
a sexed/gendered being without the constraints of a binary heteronormative sexual 
identity system. 
41
 
 
For gay and lesbian politics in the 1970s though, running alongside this radical stance 
was a constant pull towards legal validation of homosexuality as an identity, and legal 
reform to end discrimination against gays and lesbians. Like heterosexuality, 
homosexuality was seen as natural - and even for some, biological - and therefore it 
could not be said to be unlawful, and could not be a legitimate basis for 
discrimination.
42
 This has been described by some an assimilationist reformist 
position.
43
 The same could be said of the trans movement that campaigns for the legal 
recognition of a change to sex on birth certificates, of trans marriages, an end to 
discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the basis of trans status, and 
for other legal rights for trans people and non-trans people equally (all understandable 
and important goals). In the UK, these campaigns have been successful insofar as they 
have led to the introduction of the Gender Recognition Act and discussion and 
consultation on trans issues for the purposes of a recent discrimination law review.
44
 
The framework for these successful campaigns and challenges has been one of human 
rights, and what Hines and Munro would both call a turn to rights claims based on 
citizenship rather than transgression.
45
 
 
In any case, the juxtaposition of these two seemingly oppositional stances – reform 
versus revolution - is more complex than the comparison of these two outermost poles 
would suggest. Within the trans movement, the dangers of setting up the two political 
                                                 
41
 This is reminiscent of the words of Dustin Hoffman as Michael Dorsey to Jessica Lange as Julie, in 
Tootsie – “I was a better man with you as a woman, than I ever was with a woman as a man. I’ve just 
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Julie and still wear a dress! 
42
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43
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44
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positions against each other in this way are noted by Paisley Currah,
46
 who argues that 
there is a certain amount of arrogance and condescension in an academic theoretical 
postmodern position that advocates fluidity at the expense of the experiences of 
people who want to cross and yet live within the existing two-sex system. As Katrina 
Roen also points out, this view is founded upon an assumed hierarchy of knowledge 
and experience whereby passing is seen as a politically inferior way of living.
 47
 For 
the trans community however, often this hierarchy is reversed, and passing is seen as 
the ultimate goal, without which identity is always in crisis.
48
 Roen’s conclusion is 
that rather than feeding the notion that trans politics is dichotomised in this passing 
versus transgression sense, we should be striving for ways to enhance trans theorising 
through an eclectic politics. Likewise, Paisley Currah notes a tendency in academic 
writing to criticise activist strategies and goals that uphold sex/gender binaries, such 
as passing and surgery, but argues that working to dismantle gender, and working to 
end discrimination on the basis of sex/gender, including litigation strategies, should 
not be mutually exclusive. It is not a dualistic either/or strategy; rather the question is 
how to negotiate the tensions.
49
  
 
Secondly, as I suggested earlier, in reality, many people do not hold such stark 
perceptions of themselves. As Roen suggests, the two positions – both/neither and 
either/or are not mutually exclusive - “Any one person may adhere to aspects of each 
line of argument simultaneously.”50 In her interviews she found that many people 
shifted between these two positions as part of an ongoing process of living as a trans 
person. And in fact, some rejected both positions as untenable. This disjuncture 
between individual lives and experiences, and the categories that have evolved to 
describe them, is not a surprise - lived identities often do not correspond precisely 
with legal or social classifications. What is more, the tension between the complexity 
of experience and the convenience of categories and labels used to describe 
sex/gender identities is also evident in the ways in which sex/gender is represented in 
popular culture. It seems that the different stories told through the politics, theory and 
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activism of the trans community are in many ways mirrored within cinematic 
portrayals of sex/gender identity. In order to explore the ways in which different 
socio-political stances are evident within cultural representations of sex/gender, in the 
following sections I will examine the ways in which three films, Cabaret, 
Transamerica and Hedwig and the Angry Inch both reinforce and challenge the 
dichotomies of trans identity politics.  
 
Chronologically the films would be analysed from Cabaret, thorough to Hedwig and 
ending with Transamerica. However the story told here is not a linear one and 
therefore the paper begins with Cabaret and ends with Hedwig. Each film presents a 
particular set of assumptions about sex/gender identity and relates a story about both 
social acceptance, and personal fulfilment. While none of these films could in any 
way be described as a law film, political and social rights of recognition are 
implicated in all three films. Finally, each film takes a different stance towards the 
question of sex/gender identity, and each stance, I argue, can be seen to be mirrored in 
the various ways in which the trans movement engages with questions of citizenship 
and rights.  
 
4. Trans identity goes to the movies 
 
a. Cabaret, or goodbye to rigid sex and gender boundaries? 
 
Cabaret is the oldest film in the trio, and is set in Berlin in 1931 during the era of the 
Weimar Republic, which was also a period marked by the growing power of the Nazi 
party. It is based on Goodbye to Berlin which forms part of the 1930s Berlin Stories 
by Christopher Isherwood. Goodbye to Berlin was published in 1939, and has formed 
the basis of a 1951 play and a 1955 British film, both entitled I Am Camera, a 1966 
stage musical and a musical film directed by Bob Fosse in 1972, both produced under 
the name Cabaret. It is this last film version of Cabaret that I will focus on here. 
 
Quoting from Tom Milne in Sight and Sound, Stephen Bowles says that the original 
Goodbye to Berlin was “a series of airily impressionistic sketches and anecdotes 
strung together to illustrate the gradual, almost imperceptible process whereby the 
Berlin of the twenties, the city of gaiety and sin, turned into the seedbed of the Nazi 
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terror.”51 But, he argues, the more recent film version of Cabaret is less a traditional 
musical and more of a social document – the Kit Kat club, where the musical is 
mostly set, and clubs like it, provided an escape from the outside world, which was 
either banal or unpleasant.
52
 
 
In the film, a young English man Brian Roberts (Michael York) moves to Berlin and 
finds a cheap room next door to the beautiful young American Sally Bowles (Liza 
Minnelli) who is a singer in the local cabaret, the Kit Kat club. The two become 
sexually involved, and against the increasingly tense background story of the growing 
grip of the Nazi Party, they lead a life of decadence, drinking, dancing and socialising. 
They meet the exceptionally rich Maximillian (Helmut Griem) who ends up having 
sex with both of them. Sally becomes pregnant, and the film ends with Sally having 
had an abortion, and Sally and Brian split whereupon Brian decides to return to 
England. The film won 8 Oscars and great critical acclaim for the acting, music, 
direction and cinematography. 
 
Cabaret is not a trans film as such – that is, it is not a film about a transgendered 
person or community, but it is a sex/gender film and a story of the performance of 
non-normative sexualities. In that sense it has implications for trans politics because it 
challenges the heteronormative categories on which the concepts of sex, gender and 
sexual identity are based. There are drag queen performers, cross dressing musicians 
and singers, female mud wrestling matches, a song about a ménage a trios – “we 
switch partners daily to play as we please; two beats one but nothing beats three” and 
a non-monogamous marriage where the bisexual Maximillian is free to have sex with 
both Sally Bowles and Brian Roberts. The film confronts us with homosexuality, 
bisexuality, cross dressing, non-monogamy, racial difference, and androgyny - issues 
that are all connected to the political analysis of sex and gender that underlies both 
feminist and trans activism and theory. 
 
The Weimar Republic of Germany between the two world wars has been described as 
an age when anything goes and everything did go – as Alan Lareau describes it, 
“prostitution, sadism, gambling, drugs, transvestism, nudism, homosexuality, jazz, 
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alcohol, any form of sexual and sensual excess found a niche here”.53 The cabaret was 
seen as the perfect venue for breaking taboos and experimentation. The cabaret 
therefore provided a space for patrons to become the people they cannot be out with 
its boundaries, and to enjoy “fleeting diversions of the purposely grotesque world of 
the Cabaret”.54 Lareau examines what he calls the complexity of the cabaret’s cultural 
negotiations between entertainment and satirical critique, commenting that issues 
relating to homosexuality and sexual decadence and excess, which were not explicit 
in the early versions of the story, were highlighted in Fosse’s 1972 film.55 In fact, as 
Lareau points out, during the period in which the film is set, the German penal code 
still prohibited sexual activity between men (as in Britain, women, of course, were not 
explicitly included in the regulation). Although the years following World War One 
saw new tolerance regarding homosexuality, this of course changed dramatically as 
the Nazis grew in power. The subjects portrayed in Cabaret would certainly be at the 
margins of legality. With respect to the actual cabarets of the time, Lareau argues that 
while the cabaret had countercultural ambitions, it was first and foremost a 
commercial venture - if it was too radical, there would be no audience.
56
 In that sense 
it might well be the case that the film Cabaret could afford to be more radical than the 
real night clubs of that period. 
 
But the aim here is not to examine claims about historical accuracy. Rather, what 
seems clear is that the film represents sex/gender and sexuality in a particular way – 
that it derides conventional morality around sex/gender and sexuality, showing the 
cabaret as a place that provides “a forum for a plurality of lifestyles, a sort of 
waxworks chamber of taboos and abnormalities, both celebrating diversity and 
lambasting eccentricities.”57 The representation of sexuality and sex/gender here 
suggests that the boundaries between categories are fluid, and that one can cross back 
and forth between them – as Brian does in having a sexual relationship with both 
Sally and Maximillian. The viewer is drawn into a world where frontiers are made to 
be crossed, boundaries to be broken down, and the fluid movement from one to the 
other is achieved with humour and playfulness. This calls to mind the words of Judith 
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Butler who suggests that "laughter in the face of serious categories is indispensable for 
feminism".
58
 In other words, the characters in Cabaret encourage and celebrate non-
normative sex/gender and sexuality, and we as viewers are invited to do the same. The 
categories that normally bind us are not destroyed as such but rather their rigidity is 
called into question. These cinematic representations demonstrate what Sally Hines 
would call moments of transgression rather than moments of citizenship.
59
 The 
approach taken in Cabaret is reminiscent of a political stance that promotes porous 
boundaries and the ability to reject oppositional compartmentalised sex/gender 
identities. However the characters in Cabaret do not altogether dismiss the 
male/female categories, rather it is the right to a kind of subcultural identity, where 
boundaries are recognised as socially constructed and open to challenge that is 
embraced. This has implications for the kind of legal subject that could materialize 
from such a practice; the law, at least as regards sex/gender, is not comfortable with 
constant movement and fluidity, and requires that subjects be stable in their 
sex/gender categories – for example, in the UK, legal gender recognition depends in 
part upon a promise to stay in the ‘assumed’ gender for life. As such, the 
homosexual/bisexual/queer activities in Cabaret occur both metaphorically and 
literally underground, and to the extent that the characters are sex/gender rebels, they 
remain outlawed.  
 
The next movie for analysis however, does almost the opposite in its production (and 
co-option) of the ‘good’ trans citizen. 
 
b. Transamerica - the traditional transsexual subject? 
 
Directed by Duncan Tucker, Transamerica premiered in Berlin in 2005. Set in the 
US, the film tells the story of our protagonist Sabrina Claire Osborne, or Bree, (played 
by the Oscar nominated and Golden Globe winning Felicity Huffman), who having 
been born a man, is struggling for a distinct and definite female identity. She does not 
want a liminal life on the frontier, on the threshold between genders. Bree most 
definitely is reaching for recognition of her womanhood. On one level this is a road 
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trip movie. The story is one of reconciliation between Bree and her son Toby (played 
by Kevin Zegers), who was born as a result of a one-off sexual encounter while Bree 
was living as a man. Toby turns up in Bree’s life just before she is due to have her sex 
reassignment surgery. He does not know that she is trangendered, or that Bree was her 
father. Her therapist, who has to formally support Bree’s sex reassignment surgery 
before it can go ahead, advises Bree that she has to confront her past life and 
reconnect with her son, before she can go ahead with her new life. The film focuses 
on the journey, both literal and metaphorical, that Bree and Toby take together across 
America, learning about each other and themselves.  
 
The tag line for the film was “Life is more than the sum of its parts.” And the pun 
here is a clue to the essence of the film; one might read Transamerica as the 
quintessential transsexual film – Bree is trying desperately to pass and be accepted as 
a woman, the ultimate goal of her own journey to find and accept her son is to prove 
her readiness for sex reassignment surgery so that she may finally live properly, 
legally and socially, as a woman. At the beginning of the film her therapist tells her, 
“You look very authentic”. Bree replies, “I try to blend in, keep a low profile. I 
believe the slang terminology is living stealth”. Later in the film the unlikely pair 
stumble upon a transgender party at the house of friend, where they have planned to 
stay overnight. Bree apologises to Toby, for the behaviour of “phoney women” that 
they meet there – the “phoney women” are in fact, as Bree is, transgender people in 
varying stages of transition. Bree’s discomfort with the ambiguity of sex/gender and 
the open discussions of medical and sexual aspects of transsexual life is tangible in 
this scene. It reflects the contemporary struggles that transsexual people face in many 
parts of the world, and in particular the anxieties and difficulties around concealing 
one’s birth sex/gender, and passing in one’s self perceived sex/gender.  
 
Sally Hines documents the increasing visibility of trans issues in popular culture 
especially television and cinema, and suggests that while we ought not to overplay the 
political significance of this, it can give an indication of how far minority sex/gender 
identities have shifted in marginalised status.
60
 However it seems that this mainstream 
cultural acceptance is most likely to occur where the trans person is transsexual. 
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Hence, it might appear that the success of Transamerica shows that the transsexual 
who wants to cross and pass is, more than ever, accepted by mainstream culture – 
Bree does not really threaten the heteronormative order as she does not want to live as 
a trans person, continually calling into question our safe, comfortable categories of 
male/female. She is not interested, unlike many of the characters in Cabaret, in 
exploring the fluidity of boundaries. What Bree wants is to absolutely cross the 
boundary between male and female, and live and be recognised as a woman. And 
Bree identifies as a feminine, heterosexual, vaguely religious, and in most senses 
(other than her transsexuality) conventional, even traditional, ‘regular’ woman. In 
other words, in so far as she identifies in these ways, she plays by the rules of the 
heteronormative sex/gender game. This, then, is what Hines would describe as a call 
for citizenship rather than a move towards transgression. Bree claims her right to exist 
as a good citizen in a politically liberal society that rewards her for her commitment to 
heteronormativity; Bree is exactly the sort of good transsexual subject that the UK’s 
2004 Gender Recognition Act would recognise.  
 
Jessica Silbey demonstrates that certain law films represent a society “which cannot 
imagine sustainable human civilization without law”61 – Transamerica represents a 
society which cannot imagine sustainable human civilization without binary 
sex/gender. In that sense, the film takes what might be seen as the more conservative, 
assimilationist and less radical stance towards sex/gender than that portrayed in 
Cabaret. One might be tempted to read from this that Cabaret is more radical, more 
open ended, more fluid in its depitction of sexuality, and that Transamerica on the 
other hand simply reflects existing gender binaries, does not challenge the idea that 
one has to choose from the existing binary system (and once chosen, stick to it), and 
demonstrates a deep anxiety about sex/gender ambiguity. In an age of postmodern and 
queer and feminist legal and social theory, one might be tempted to prefer and 
privilege strategies that mirror the representation of sex/gender in cabaret than those 
implied by the film Transamerica. However, Transamerica is in many ways the more 
popular, successful and mainstream movie, and here the (implicitly non-trans) viewer 
of the Hollywood mainstream movie is invited to witness that while transsexual 
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people face hardship and discrimination, they are people ‘just like us’, who deserve 
socio-political and cultural acceptance.  
 
These two seemingly contradictory representations of sex/gender/sexuality that are set 
out in Cabaret and Transamerica - fluidity versus rigidity - are also evident within the 
ways in which trans activists have approached the issue of identity and citizenship, as 
discussed above. However it appears that such a stark division in approach is not 
always reflected in the ways in which people themselves understand their experience 
of what it means to live as trans, as demonstrated by Roen. Moreover, these polar 
positions still appear to be anchored within the available sex/gender compartments of 
male/female, even though one approach is more fluid than the other. Is it really 
possible to move beyond these two approaches, and the existence of sex/gender 
categories? It is here, with the possibility of rejection of the available positions for 
anchoring gender, that Hedwig comes in. 
 
 
c. Hedwig and the Angry Inch – or somewhere I have never travelled, gladly beyond 
 
Hedwig and the Angry Inch is a 2001 film based on a book that became a stage 
musical, written and directed by John Cameron Mitchell (of more recent Shortbus 
(2006) fame). The movie is set in East Berlin, not long before the Berlin wall comes 
down, and tells the story of Hedwig formerly Hansel, (played by Mitchell himself), 
who wants to escape East Berlin and go back to the US with his new GI Joe boyfriend 
(who has initially mistaken Hansel for a girl). The only way he can do so is to marry 
him, and the only way to marry is to have sex reassignment surgery in Berlin. The 
operation is botched and Hansel, now Hedwig, is left with an angry inch (also the 
name of Hedwig’s band). The film tells the story, as a musical, of Hedwig trying to 
come to terms with this new physical state, and in particular how this impacts upon 
relationships with others.
62
 The story starts with the band, who are on tour, playing a 
gig in a seedy, half-empty restaurant, while Hedwig’s ex-boyfriend, Tommy, who has 
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stolen all of Hedwig’s songs, is now famous and is playing at a huge rock concert 
venue next door. The film is fabulous and flamboyant and has been described as a 
“Post-punk neo-glam rock odyssey”.63  
 
Although Hedwig describes “herself” as a “girly boy from East Berlin”, s/he is also 
called a faggot by an audience member, and throughout the film it is not clear whether 
we, the viewers, are supposed to think of Hedwig as a man or a woman. Hedwig 
dresses and performs as a woman, but in over exaggerated drag queen/glam rock 
style. But the angry inch is still very much there - “It’s what I have to work with”, 
says Hedwig. This lack of certainty that the audience experiences over Hedwig’s 
sex/gender is at least in part due to a concurrent ambiguity in Hedwig’s sexuality.  
Hedwig is confused about who would be the right sexual partner. The GI is a macho 
military type, and Hedwig’s most recent partner, Tommy Gnosis is a young beautiful 
boy. But Hedwig’s lover in the band, Yitzhak, appears to be a very feminine man who 
has a female singing voice, who dreams of being a drag queen and is often found 
playing with Hedwig’s wigs. In fact this character is played by a woman, Miriam 
Shor.  
 
Moreover, there is no suggestion in the film that Hedwig is ‘psychologically’ female. 
The description of Hedwig as a transsexual woman seems to depend completely on 
the fact that ‘she’ dresses and lives as a woman and does not in any conventional 
sense have a “functioning” penis.64 In short, Hedwig is in some senses man, in some 
senses female, and because of that, Hedwig’s sexuality is also ambiguous – is Hedwig 
a transsexual? Is she a straight woman? Is he a gay drag queen? We, the audience, 
realise that if only we could decide whether Hedwig was gay or straight, we might be 
able to say whether or not Hedwig is male or female. Hedwig provides a clear 
example of how our normative assumptions about sex/gender and sexuality are 
intimately interwoven, that they are firmly anchored in the binary dichotomous M/F 
paradigm, and that ambiguity about sex/gender throws our expectations about  
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sexuality into confusion, and vice versa. This assumption that sex/gender and 
sexuality will line up in a way that makes sense of who a person is, is what Judith 
Butler calls the "Compulsory Order of Sex/Gender/Desire".
65
 Hedwig flouts the rules of 
sex/gender/desire in his/her embodiment of queer desire, queer identity and queer sexual 
practice that cannot be easily captured in binary categories, inhabiting a queer world 
where “social bodies only exist in a process of constant historical transformation, ... there 
are only hybrid bodies, moving bodies, migrant bodies, becoming bodies”.66  
  
At the end of the film, Hedwig only finds peace by accepting the body and mind s/he 
has, becoming whole not by finding the perfect partner, but by becoming whole 
inside, and loving her/himself. Finally, Hedwig is transformed from a performing drag 
queen to an androgynous young rock star in the mould of David Bowie or Iggy Pop 
(two of Hedwig’s boyhood heroes).  Hedwig seems to have found inner reconciliation 
with both male and female aspects of sex/gender in way that really is more than the 
sum of the male and female parts. In some sense there is a rejection of the 
both/neither and either/or positions, and an acknowledgment of the beauty of the 
particularity of the person beyond gender. It is this idea of beyond that is so politically 
tantalising about Hedwig. 
 
Is it possible to be beyond gender? Judith Butler argues that there is no doer before 
gender, that we become sexed and sexual subjects through the ‘doing’ of gender. This 
is not to say that we choose our subjecthood through choosing how we perform 
gender, since to a great extent the binary normative framework that guides us in 
conceptualising gender - heterosexuality - is already a constraining force in our lives. 
It is not possible imagine or make choices that lie out with this constraining force, 
even though we can try to ‘play’ with gender and challenge its confines from within. 
The issue then is not whether one has the choice to reiterate (or not) the norms, but 
how to do so, and whether, through a “radical proliferation of gender”, 67 to queer or 
displace those norms. While we can offer some resistance to the power of 
heteronormativity, our ‘choices’ about if and how to ‘do’ gender are always-already 
mediated through its lens. Here Butler is not suggesting that there is no such thing as 
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agency, but rather there is no possibility of agency “outside of the discursive practices 
that give those terms the intelligibility they have”.68 
 
For Butler, one does not qualify as a girl unless one continually repeats the 
performance of femininity.
69
 We become male or female through every day rituals of 
performing masculinity and femininity. And indeed we are more likely to notice 
gender in its absence or variance than in its everyday and ritualised, normative sense. 
 
“Because there is neither an “essence” that gender expresses or externalizes nor an 
objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the 
various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there 
would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals 
its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete 
and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those 
productions - the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the 
“construction” compels our belief in its necessity and naturalness”.70  
 
The punishments she is referring to that are imposed on those who attempt to 
transgress gender are listed as including “the surgical correction of intersexed persons, 
the medical and psychiatric pathologization and criminalisation in several countries, 
including the United States of “gender dysphoric” people, the harassment of gender-
troubled persons on the street or in the workplace, employment discrimination, and 
violence”.71 The transgendered person, for example, cannot become a recognised 
gendered subject before the law, who can marry, work, and achieve recognition 
through sexual citizenship, unless they become male or female, unless they achieve 
and perform gender as men or as women. At least as far as the UK’s 2004 Gender 
Recognition Act is concerned, it a very particular kind of transgender citizen – i.e. the 
transsexual citizen - that is recognised in law. The transsexual person is subject to 
(and the subject of) rigorous medico-legal procedures and discourses, including a 
diagnosis of a mental disorder (gender dysphoria), before the “assumed gender” can 
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be legally recognised. One might go as far as to argue, as Ralph Sandland so 
eloquently has done, that this process of ‘recognition’ is only engaged and brought to 
fruition if the trans person conforms to naturalised ideals of heterosexual marriage and 
family life, and where a legal promise is made to remain in the “assumed gender” for 
life.
72
 In that sense, the process fails to recognise difference. The recognition so 
tantalising offered to the trans person, by way of these legislative provisions, is 
ultimately a misrecognition of otherness, and only applies to those trans folk who 
submit to the sameness of heteronormativity in all its binary monochrome.
73
 
 
Further examples of the constraining regulatory effect of law upon trans people can be 
found in other jurisdictions. For example, in Canada, human rights challenges to the 
exclusion of trans women from certain ‘women only’ spaces such as a rape crisis 
centre
74
 has led to a more entrenched dichotomised positioning between those who 
believe that only those born and socialised as women are ‘women enough’ to populate 
a women only space, and those who believe that womanhood is something that can be 
at least partly self defined, expressed and determined by an individuals. The 
unfortunate result here was not only the court’s refusal to recognise Kimberley 
Nixon’s claim to individual self determination, but also the denial of her right to be 
recognised as part of the social group ‘women’. As the sociologist Raewyn Collins 
has argued , contesting gender is not (solely) about “individual gestures of dissent” 
but involves “a collective process (of) social struggle” which in turn “requires some 
base of solidarity, of mutual support”.75 What is more, the debate has perpetuated 
deep divisions within the Canadian feminist community about what constitutes 
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womanhood, despite the potential that discussion of transgender issues have to expose 
sex/gender debates to a more complicated and empowering analysis. This in turn 
raises questions about the value of a human rights approach in this area, and in 
particular, questions about who counts as human in order to make successful legal 
rights claims. 
 
In other words, to become male or female is to become an individually recognised 
person. To achieve gender is to achieve personhood. To become a man or a woman is 
to become human. In a very real sense the struggles of trans people demonstrate this. 
Trans people experience the constraining forces of heteronormativity in their bids for 
citizenship and recognition. Maleness and femaleness as medico-legally understood is 
always contained by the normative ideals of heterosexuality (not homo-, bi-, a- or 
poly-sexuality), monogamy (not polygamy or polyamory), marriage (rather than non-
marital relationships), life long commitment (rather than short term, casual, or 
intermittent connections), dual (rather than solo or multiple) systems of partnership, 
and family life (based on the primacy of relationships with, children, spouses and 
relatives rather than friends, workmates or non-spousal intimates). If the trans(sexual) 
person conforms to these ideals, he or she is formally recognised as both gendered, 
and consequently human. The struggle to become a man or woman who is legally 
recognised as such, then, is a struggle where gender is precondition to becoming 
human - or what Butler calls a “presupposition of humanness”.76 
 
On this reading, it is not really possible to travel beyond gender. Perhaps one reason 
that Hedwig appeals to us, then, is because despite the impossibility of a genderless 
world, we are attracted to the utopian quality of the moment that Hedwig experiences 
at the end of the film. However, in the real world, it seems, we may just be stuck with 
gender, at least for the foreseeable future. How we engage gender, and how we ‘play’ 
with its binaries are the areas where we should apply our energies for imaginative 
engagement. In so far as Hedwig lives at the limits of intelligibility, then, what 
Hedwig shows us is that, in Butler’s words, “There are humans… who live and 
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breathe in the interstices of this binary relationship, showing that it is not exhaustive; 
it is not necessary”.77 
 
One final important question we are must attend to is as to whether it is possible to 
travel beyond the reform/revolution dichotomous and divisive cul-de-sac in which 
trans politics often finds itself. Paisley Currah argues that here trans legal scholars can 
learn from critical race theory – that we can challenge the ‘reality’ of categories while 
still battling real discrimination based on those categories.
78
 Our focus should be on 
the effect of the system of subordination – even though the categories aren’t ‘real’, the 
effects are real material effects and consequences. Without conflating the two, Currah 
points out that this is similar to the central issue in battles over racial equality. Currah 
suggests that some trans activists are already doing both – inhabiting and challenging 
gender categories.
79
 The conclusion is that we should develop gender pluralism - and 
in fact, he says, through necessity trans activists are already doing this; in the trans 
community beliefs about gender so incommensurate that pluralism has become the 
only thing that people could agree on, and this is its strength. Likewise Roen 
concludes that there is a wide variety of transgender experiences, and that in failing to 
recognise this we thereby obscure the subtleties and nuances in the ways that 
individuals negotiate competing categories and discourses throughout their lives.
80
 As 
Hedwig shows us, and as Currah would put it, it’s about “letting many flowers 
bloom”.81 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Jeffrey Weeks suggests that most social movements such a feminism, the gay and 
lesbian movement, and now the transgender movement, are characterised by an initial 
moment of transgression, but that this is always followed by a claim to citizenship – 
after the invention of new selves comes claims to rights for these new selves.
82
 
However he urges us to remember that in the move towards inclusion, “we must also 
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bring a more radical voice into the frame”.83 In our moments of legal recognition then, 
it is important to remember the exclusionary as well as inclusionary tendencies of law.  
 
What does film have to do with all of this? We have seen how different parts of the 
trans movement, as well as different cinematic portrayals of sex/gender, have tended 
towards either transgression/ assimilation and citizenship. Where trans folk look and 
behave ‘just like us’ (i.e. non trans folk), they are more legally and socially tolerable. 
That Transamerica was so successful, I would contend, is connected to the fact that 
transsexual folk, as opposed to trans folk in general, are less threatening to the 
heteronormative order. The representation of a world that can conceive of fluid 
boundaries, or even more radically, the representation of a world beyond gender, has 
perhaps less purchase in terms of its translation into coherent legal and social rights of 
sexual citizenship. And that transsexual people and not trans people generally are 
more readily recognised in legal claims to citizenship supports the heteronormative 
concession that those who cross (and stay crossed) are more readily acceptable than 
those who try to live in between or beyond. As Hines has argued, “Although the law 
now allows for movement across the binary of male/ female, the spectrums in-
between male and female, such as transgendered, intersexed, bigendered and 
androgynous, remain outside current frameworks of citizenship.”84 
 
Johnston and Buchanan exhort us to look at film and ask questions about the legal 
world, such as – “how do the available narratives operate to amplify the veracity of a 
particular account?” 85 Similarly, here I have raised questions about what particular 
accounts of trans identity are given primacy within law, and how can film help us to 
reflect upon questions about which sexed/gendered people get to count as citizens, 
and are socially and legally recognised as viable humans within the existing 
heteronormative system.  
 
In each of these three films we can see various ways of interpreting and reworking the 
constraints that heteronormative binary notions of sex/gender place on all our lives, 
and these struggles over meaning are reflected in the ways in which different 
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articulations of trans identity and citizenship claims have been heard in society, and in 
law. But I want to end with my friend Hedwig, who manages to leave us at the end of 
the film with a sense that he is somehow beyond the ordinary parameters of gender. 
And it is only by rejecting the fundamental importance of gender categories, and by 
refusing to be understood in terms of the referent of gender, that Hedwig is able to 
walk out in the world as human, reborn. Has Hedwig simply accepted, finally, that he 
is a man with a small penis, and is not ashamed of his body? I would like to believe 
that Hedwig’s final moment of reincarnation, his individual gesture of dissent, signals 
something else - the possibility of humanity and personhood, a way of being “which 
we do not yet know how to name or that sets a limit on all naming”86 for which 
gender is not a referent, and in which we can walk amongst each other without the 
need for gender recognition. 
                                                 
86
 Butler, supra note 62, at p74. 
